vibey-gh for Governments

Armed forces adopt software under the hardest obligations any institution carries: every artifact in the supply chain must be attributable under audit, every automated decision reconstructible after the fact, operations must continue when networks, vendors, or funding lanes are denied — and no capability may be hostage to a supplier's continued goodwill. Most release automation fails those obligations quietly: unpinned tools drift, review verdicts outlive the code they judged, and provenance is a convention rather than a check. vibey-gh was built so that failure class cannot occur. This page states what a defense institution gets and how each claim is verified; civil agencies inherit every guarantee unchanged.

What this is, with no prior context

vibey-gh is a small program that watches a software project and carries every proposed change through checking, review, approval, publication, and record-keeping without a person pushing it at each step — the way a disciplined orderly room moves a file. A "change" here is a precise, itemized edit to the project's files; nothing moves unless the checks tied to that exact edit pass, and every action is written down where an inspector can read it later.

Mission assurance, claim by claim

  • Chain of custody is total. Every source file carries a provenance header and every change a provenance trailer (the fingerprint), enforced by a required check — not by directive. An artifact of unknown origin cannot enter the chain.
  • Decisions bind to evidence — configuration control by construction. A review verdict applies only to the exact revision it examined (exact-head evaluation); a stale approval can never wave newer code through. This is the property audit and accreditation regimes assume and rarely get.
  • Continuity of operations under denial is first-class. Loss of a paid service, a network, a vendor relationship, or a funding lane moves work to local lanes and back automatically (sovereign operation); the fallback ladder is ordered by refusability, so the last rung — local models on local hardware — answers to no one's permission. Contested and disconnected environments are the design case, not an afterthought (doctrine 10.a).
  • No captive dependencies, ever. Zero runtime dependencies, keyless publishing via OIDC Trusted Publishing, full rebuild from source on any machine — documentation, book, and research paper included. Exit is always possible; that is a design rule, not a promise.
  • The record exists before the inspector asks. Evaluations, repairs, merges, releases, and yanks land in workflow logs, signed commits, and immutable release indexes — a public, durable audit trail.
  • Machine agents operate under written law. The Constitution, the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and standing subdoctrine SD-01 bind every agent, human and machine — bounded delegation, labeled machine speech, and a counterparty-verification discipline (default-unverified, tangible checks, corrupted states get zero trust) that reads like it was written for a security office, because its concerns are the same. Ratified governance changes supersede all prior artifacts (Article V.4): nothing circulates under superseded law.

Verification, not trust

Each claim above is checkable from a clean, disconnected machine with public materials: install the pinned release, run vibey-gh check --ci, read the rulesets, replay a release run's logs against its tag. The configuration reference names every policy knob; the CLI reference names every operation; the formal statements — soundness, termination, monotone releases, the supersession invariant — are in the research paper with proofs or proof sketches.

An institution that adopts this gets what the opening promised: attributable artifacts, reconstructible decisions, continuity under denial, and an exit that never closes. The concrete next step is one command — pip install "vibey-gh==1.58.0" — followed by the adoption guide on a repository that matters to the mission.